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Abstract Appropriate modulation of imitation according
to social context is important for successful social inter-
action. In the present study we subliminally primed high-
functioning adults with ASC and age- and IQ-matched
controls with either a pro- or non- social attitude. Fol-
lowing priming, an automatic imitation paradigm was used
to acquire an index of imitation. Whereas imitation levels
were higher for pro-socially primed relative to non-socially
primed control participants, there was no difference
between pro- and non- socially primed individuals with
ASC. We conclude that high-functioning adults with ASC
demonstrate atypical social modulation of imitation. Given
the importance of imitation in social interaction we spec-
ulate that difﬁculties with the modulation of imitation may
contribute to the social problems characteristic of ASC.
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Imitation (also known as ‘mimicry’) is intricately linked
with social interaction. Being imitated increases rapport
(Chartrand and Bargh 1999), altruistic behavior (van Baa-
ren et al. 2004) and trust (Bailenson and Yee 2005). Fur-
thermore, individuals imitate more when in possession of a
positive social attitude (Lakin and Chartrand 2003;
Leighton et al. 2010). For example, subliminal pro-social,
compared to non-social, priming results in signiﬁcantly
higher levels of imitation (Cook and Bird 2011; Leighton
et al. 2010). Thus, imitation is bi-directionally associated
with good social interaction and is therefore a key compo-
nent in building social relationships with others. Crucially,
successful social interaction relies on appropriate modula-
tion of the degree of imitation according to the demands of
the social situation (Lakin and Chartrand 2003).
Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) are characterised by
impairments in social interaction, language, and commu-
nication (American Psychiatric Association 1994). A
number of studies have demonstrated reduced imitation and
Mirror Neuron System (MNS) activity in individuals with
ASC compared to control participants (Williams et al.
2004). The MNS is a network of brain areas active when an
individual both executes and observes an action (Catmur
et al. 2008; Iacoboni et al. 1999) and has been argued to
comprise the neural mechanism that underpins imitation
(Catmur et al. 2007; Heiser et al. 2003; Iacoboni et al.
1999). It has been hypothesised that a ‘broken MNS’ and
corresponding imitation impairment is a core feature of
ASC (Williams et al. 2001). However, experimental evi-
dence both supports (Avikainen et al. 2003; Dapretto et al.
2006; McIntosh et al. 2006; Oberman et al. 2005; Rogers
et al. 2003) and opposes (Bird et al. 2007; Dinstein et al.
2010; Gowen et al. 2008; Hamilton et al. 2007; Leighton
et al. 2008; Press et al. 2010; Spengler et al. 2010) the
presence of an imitation impairment in ASC. Furthermore,
clinical observations of high levels of echolalia (automatic
repetition of speech patterns) and echopraxia (automatic
imitation of observed actions) in individuals with ASC
(Russell 1997; Rutter 1974; Williams et al. 2004) are
incompatible with an imitation deﬁcit in ASC, and instead
suggest problems with inhibition of imitation.
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suggested that, rather than an imitation deﬁcit per se,
individuals with ASC may have difﬁculties with appro-
priately modulating levels of imitation (Hamilton 2008;
Kana et al. 2011; Spengler et al. 2010). Although this
hypothesis has not previously been tested, it is consistent
with studies of individuals with ASC that report hypoac-
tivity in parts of the brain thought to be involved in the
modulation of imitation (Castelli et al. 2000; Spengler et al.
2010). Given the importance of appropriate levels of imi-
tation for positive social interaction (Lakin and Chartrand
2003) this hypothesis may go some way towards explaining
difﬁculties with social interaction in individuals with ASC.
The present study used a behavioural measure of imi-
tation, as opposed to a measure of MNS activity, to directly
test the hypothesis that the social modulation of imitation is
atypical in individuals with ASC. High-functioning adults
with ASC and age and IQ-matched controls ﬁrst completed
a previously-validated (Bargh and Chartrand 2000; Cook
and Bird 2011; Leighton et al. 2010) technique to uncon-
sciously prime either a pro-social, or non-social attitude.
Participants were asked to ‘unscramble’ re-arranged sen-
tences, a proportion of which were related to either pro-
social attitudes (‘‘she is my friend’’) or non-social attitudes
(‘‘he is often alone’’). Following this subliminal priming,
participants completed an automatic imitation task. We
predicted that, as in previous studies (Cook and Bird 2011;
Leighton et al. 2010), pro-socially primed control partici-
pants would show increased levels of imitation relative to
non-socially primed control participants. In line with the
impaired modulation of imitation in ASC hypothesis, we
predicted no signiﬁcant difference in levels of imitation for
pro-socially and non-socially primed ASC groups.
Methods
Participants
19 adults (mean 40.9 years) with ASC and 22 age- and IQ-
matched control individuals participated in this experiment
(see Table 1 for further details). All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and were screened for
exclusion criteria (dyslexia, epilepsy, and any other neu-
rological or psychiatric conditions) prior to taking part.
Participants with ASC had a written diagnosis from an
independent clinician, which they received no more than
5 years before taking part in this experiment, and all par-
ticipants (save one for whom data was not available) scored
above threshold for Autism Spectrum Disorder on the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord
et al. 2000). We were unable to distinguish between par-
ticipants with Asperger Syndrome and Autism, as we did
not have information about early development of language
in our participants. Participants were randomly assigned to
either the Pro- or Non-social Prime Group. ANOVAs
demonstrated no main effect of, or interaction between,
Prime Group and Diagnostic Group on age or full scale IQ
(all ps[0.1). The two ASC groups did not differ with
respect to ADOS score (non-social mean (SEM) = 10.00
(1.00), pro-social mean (SEM) = 9.88 (1.01), t(16) = 0.08,
p = 0.93), age (non-social mean (SEM) = 41.30 (3.84),
pro-social mean (SEM) = 40.56 (4.50), t(17) = 0.13,
p = 0.90), full scale IQ (non-social mean (SEM) = 114.44
(4.99), pro-social mean (SEM) = 111.44 (6.11), t(16) =
0.38, p = 0.70), verbal IQ (non-social mean (SEM) =
116.22 (3.33), pro-social mean (SEM) = 112.00 (5.92),
t(16) = 0.62, p = 0.54) or performance IQ (non-social
mean (SEM) = 108.89 (6.57), pro-social mean (SEM) =
108.78 (6.48), t(16) = 0.12, p = 0.99). Informed consent
was obtained from all participants. The study was approved
by the local ethics committee, and performed in accordance
with the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Priming Task
Participants were asked to select, in order, 4 words from 5
displayed on a computer screen to make a grammatically
correct sentence (see Leighton et al. 2010). 24 out of 36
total trials contained a word semantically related to the
target attitude (pro-social or non-social; Table 2). Priming
words were generated in a pilot session by an independent
group of participants. Although they were not identical
Table 1 Participant
information
Age, full scale IQ, and ADOS
scores. Note that the ADOS
total cut-off value for a
diagnosis of ASC is 7.
N denotes the number of
available data sets
Non-social Pro-social
ASC Control ASC Control
Participants per group 10 11 9 11
Mean age (SEM) 41.30 (3.84) 35.27 (5.29) 40.56 (4.50) 34.55 (4.72)
Mean full scale
IQ (SEM)
114.44 (4.99)
(N = 9)
119.43 (4.11) (N = 7) 111.44 (6.11) 117.44 (7.73) (N = 10)
Mean ADOS
total (SEM)
10.0 (1.00) n/a 9.88 (1.01)
(N = 9)
n/a
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(2010).
Automatic Imitation Task
The Automatic Imitation Task was based on that used by
Iacoboni et al. (1999) and Brass et al. (2000); for further
details see Cook and Bird (2011). Videos (6 visual angle
vertically 9 9horizontally, 3,000 msduration) ofahuman
hand were presented vertically on a computer screen. The
participantrestedtheirhandinahorizontalorientationonthe
computerkeyboard,withtheirindexﬁngerholdingdownthe
‘V’keyandtheirmiddleﬁngerholdingdownthe‘B’key.The
participant was required to lift and replace their index or
middleﬁngerupontheappearanceofa1ora2,respectively.
50% of trials comprised a ﬁve-frame video clip of a con-
current lifting action that was either compatible (e.g. the
participant was required to make an index ﬁnger response
andobservedanindexﬁngeraction)orincompatible(e.g.the
participant was required to make an index ﬁnger response
and observed a middle-ﬁnger action) with the required
movement (Fig. 1). Imitation was calculated as the differ-
ence in reaction time (RT) on congruent and incongruent
trials.50%oftrialscomprisedathree-frame‘baseline’video
clip in which the ﬁngers remained static and either the
compatible or incompatible ﬁnger acquired a green mask;
Table 2 Priming words, priming task errors and compatible and incompatible reaction time [RT (ms)] data for the imitation task and the
baseline trials
Non-social Pro-social
ASC Control ASC Control
Priming words Rebel, selﬁsh, alone, single, independent,
withdrawn, secluded, uncooperative,
disagreeable, independence, private, himself,
individual, think, solitary, solo, detached, lone,
separate, one, isolated, personal, self, unpopular
Friend, talkative, sociable, married, outgoing,
crowded, cooperative, agreeable, family,
friendly, group, others, team, chatty, gathering,
together, unity, sharing, joined, interactions,
society, meeting, community, popularity
Mean priming task errors (SEM) 5.20 (2.90) 3.64 (1.16) 2.70 (1.05) 2.91 (0.93)
Mean incompatible RT (SEM) 568.03 (38.48) 511.19 (28.83) 523.09 (30.85) 591.92 (43.30)
Mean compatible RT (SEM) 531.43 (35.88) 475.77 (22.64) 488.26 (29.39) 509.41 (30.57)
Mean incompatible baseline RT (SEM) 592.68 (43.88) 541.58 (31.67) 529.77 (29.56) 582.21 (38.77)
Mean compatible baseline RT (SEM) 535.37 (29.16) 495.97 (21.59) 526.40 (31.81) 534.80 (35.53)
Fig. 1 a The ﬁve-frame action video clip. Frame one was displayed
for a variable interval (range: 800–2,400 ms). Frames two and three
were displayed for 34 ms each and frame four for 500 ms. These
display durations ensured the appearance of a short video clip. The
ﬁfth frame (a black screen) remained on screen until the duration of
the trial had reached 3,000 ms and the participant had returned both
ﬁngers to the letters V and B on the keyboard. b The three frames of a
‘baseline’ trial. Frame one was displayed for a variable interval.
Frame two was displayed for 568 ms and the ﬁnal frame was
displayed until the duration of the trial had reached 3,000 ms and the
participant had returned both ﬁngers to the letters V and B
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ﬁnger movements independent of imitation. 120 trials were
presented in pseudo-random order. There were no breaks
during the task, the duration of which was approximately
15 min.
Before data acquisition participants received standard-
ized instructions, completed 5 practice trials of the Priming
Task, and made 5 correct consecutive responses
[p (chance)\0.05] on the Automatic Imitation Task.
Finally participants completed a debrieﬁng questionnaire
(Leighton et al. 2010).
Results
Priming Task
Errors were infrequent on the Priming Task (mean error
rate was l0%). A 2 9 2 ANOVA on Priming Task error
data showed no main effect of Diagnostic Group or Prime
Group and no interaction (all F(1,37)\1, all p[0.40; see
Table 2 for mean and SEM values).
Automatic Imitation Task
Automatic Imitation Task error-trials and reaction times
(RTs)\150 ms and [2,000 ms were removed from the
analysis. Paired-samples t tests demonstrated that all four
groups exhibited signiﬁcant imitation, i.e. RTs on Com-
patible trials were signiﬁcantly faster than on Incompatible
trials (all ps\0.01, see Table 2). A 2 9 2 ANOVA on the
magnitude of Automatic Imitation shown on this task (RT
on Incompatible Trials minus RT on Compatible Trials, see
Fig. 2) showed an interaction between Diagnostic- (ASC,
Control) and Prime Group (Non-social, Pro-social),
F(1,37) = 2.92, p = 0.048 (1-tailed), gp
2 = 0.07). Simple
effects analyses demonstrated that the effect of social
priming was clearly shown in the Control Group: partici-
pants who were unconsciously primed with a pro-social
attitude imitated more [mean (SEM) = 82.51 ms (22.20)]
than those primed with a non-social attitude (35.42 ms
(10.18); F(1,37) = 5.87, p = 0.02 gp
2 = 0.14). However,
the ASC Group showed no such social modulation of their
automatic imitative behaviour: the degree of imitation
shown by the pro-socially primed participants with ASC
[34.83 ms (8.76)] was not different from that shown by the
non-socially primed participants with ASC (36.61 ms
(8.01); F(1,37) = 0.007, p = 0.93, gp
2 = 0.00). In addition,
simple effects analysis showed that the degree of imitation
shown by the Control Pro-Social Group was signiﬁcantly
greater than that shown by the ASC Pro-social Group
[F(1,37) = 5.42, p = 0.03, gp
2 = 0.13]. In contrast, the
Control and ASC Non-social Groups did not differ
[F(1,37) = 0.004, p = 0.95, gp
2 = 0.00].
Previous research has shown that the magnitude of
imitation is modulated by mean RT (Press et al. 2005). A
2 9 2 ANOVA on baseline trial RT (mean RT across all
baseline trials—i.e. trials in which the ﬁnger remained
static and acquired a green mask) showed no signiﬁcant
effects of Prime Group, Diagnostic Group nor interaction
(all ps[0.1, see Table 2). A 2 9 2 ANOVA on incon-
gruent (e.g. participant lifted index ﬁnder and middle ﬁnger
acquired green mask) minus congruent (e.g. participant
lifted index ﬁnder and index ﬁnger acquired green mask)
baseline trial RTs showed no signiﬁcant effects of Prime
Group, Diagnostic Group nor interaction (all ps[0.1).
Therefore, we are conﬁdent that the interaction between
Prime Group and Diagnostic Group on the magnitude of
imitation is not a product of mean RT differences.
Debrieﬁng Questionnaire
Examination of the debrieﬁng questionnaire data indicated
that no participant correctly guessed the purpose of either
the Priming or Automatic Imitation Task. Furthermore, no
participant correctly identiﬁed a link between the tasks or a
theme among the words presented in the Priming Task.
Therefore, we can conclude that no participant was aware
of the type of priming they had received or that the purpose
of the study was to examine imitation and its relationship
with social attitudes.
Discussion
In agreement with previous studies (Cook and Bird 2011;
Leighton et al. 2010) we found that control participants
Fig. 2 Pro-socially primed participants in the Control Group imitated
more than non-socially primed participants. Participants with ASC
showed no such social modulation of imitation: the degree of
imitation shown by the ASC Pro-social Group did not differ from that
shown by the ASC Non-social Group. Furthermore the Control Pro-
Social Group showed signiﬁcantly greater imitation than the ASC
Pro-social Group. In contrast, the Control and ASC Non-social
Groups did not differ. *Indicates p\0.05
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friend, crowded, team, talkative) showed signiﬁcantly
higher levels of imitation than control participants primed
with words promoting non-social attitudes (e.g. himself,
solo, one, private). There was no signiﬁcant difference
between imitation levels shown by individuals with ASC
primed with pro-social words compared with those primed
with non-social words. These results comprise the ﬁrst
experimental evidence of atypical social modulation of
imitation in individuals with ASC. The ability to appro-
priately modulate levels of imitation to suit the social sit-
uation is important in social interactions (Lakin and
Chartrand 2003) hence we speculate that difﬁculties with
the modulation of imitation may contribute to the social
problems characteristic of ASC. In addition, this ﬁnding
suggests that future studies of imitation and MNS function
in ASC should consider the extent to which the task
includes cues that may act as unconscious social primes.
Efforts should be made to either eliminate these cues (and
therefore investigate un-modulated MNS function), or
include social cues as a factor in the experimental design.
Although no previous studies have directly tested the
hypothesis that social modulation of imitation is atypical in
ASC, Oberman et al. (2008) investigated MNS activity
whilst participants observed hand actions conducted by a
familiar (self or parent) and unfamiliar (stranger) other.
Oberman et al. (2008) measured mu wave suppression as
an indirect measure of MNS activity. They demonstrated
that children with ASC showed signiﬁcantly less mu wave
suppression compared to typically-developing children
whilst observing actions performed by the unfamiliar actor.
However, when observing actions performed by the
familiar actor there was no difference between the groups.
If familiarity is considered a social prime these results may
be interpreted as evidence of social modulation of the MNS
in ASC and therefore incompatible with the results of the
present experiment. However, different stimuli were used
in familiar and unfamiliar conditions in the study by
Oberman and colleagues. Therefore, rather than being a
product of social modulation, the results may be a conse-
quence of stimulus-speciﬁc characteristics. For example,
observation of familiar and unfamiliar actors may prompt
differing levels of attention or motivation. In the present
study identical automatic imitation paradigms were
employed for both pro-social and non-social groups and
therefore there were no differences in stimulus character-
istics that might constitute different bottom-up signals for
attentional engagement or motivation.
Although there is no bottom-up role for attention in our
results, it is possible that attention may play a ‘top-down’
role in our observed effect: pro-social priming may
increase imitation by enhancing attention to biological
stimuli. However, as we have previously argued (Cook and
Bird 2011), there is little evidence to support this hypoth-
esis in the context of this paradigm. For both the pro-social
and non-social groups, the imitation paradigm required
attention to the same part of the screen as the movement
stimuli (i.e. the cue to move was presented equidistant from
the index and middle ﬁngers of the video hand); any trials
in which participants did not attend were detected by
checking for incorrect responses, and for abnormally long
or short reaction times, and these trials were excluded from
the analysis. Furthermore, using this same paradigm we
have previously reported evidence (Cook and Bird 2011)
that the distribution of reaction times does not ﬁt with a
model of social priming affecting attentional process
(where pro-social and non-social groups should differ even
for the fastest responses). Rather, the distribution of reac-
tion times ﬁts a model of social priming affecting an
inhibitory process (where pro-social and non-social groups
need not necessarily differ for the fastest responses but
should differ for the slowest responses). Therefore, it is
likely that, rather than attentional mechanisms, social
priming affects the inhibition of imitative responses; that is
the pro-social group, compared to the non-social group are
less likely to inhibit automatic imitative responses.
Why might the effect of social priming on the inhibition
of imitative responses differ between control participants
and those with ASC? A recent set of studies suggests that
the control of imitation relies on social cognitive processes
for distinguishing one’s own actions from the actions of
another individual (Brass et al. 2005, 2003; Spengler et al.
2010). These social cognitive processes and imitation-
inhibition both elicit activity in medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ): key nodes in
the social brain network (Brothers 1990; Frith 2007; Frith
and Frith 2010). Spengler et al. (2010) recently showed
that, in individuals with ASC, low levels of MPFC and TPJ
activity during a mentalising task were associated with
poor imitation-inhibition. Although the neural correlates of
pro-social priming have not been elucidated and it is not
clear that imitation-enhancement and imitation-inhibition
depend on overlapping brain areas, the work of Spengler
and Brass suggests a testable hypothesis for future inves-
tigation: compared to control participants, individuals with
ASC have a reduced social brain response to pro-social
primes and hence exhibit atypical modulation of imitation.
This hypothesis bears similarities with the ‘social relevance
hypothesis’ proposed by Oberman et al. (2008) which
suggests that, compared to typically-developing individu-
als, those with ASC require stimuli with greater social
relevance in order to elicit comparable levels of MNS
activity.
It is also possible that atypical modulation of imitation
following pro-social priming is an instance of a more
general failure of top-down modulation in individuals with
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magnetic resonance imaging report both greater and lesser
connectivity between frontal and posterior areas in indi-
viduals with ASC compared to control participants. Bird
et al. (2006) reported a reduced top-down inﬂuence of
attention on face processing. Similarly, Kana et al. (2009)
demonstrated underconnectivity between frontal and pos-
terior regions during a mentalising task. More recently,
greater task-independent connectivity between prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and MNS regions has been reported in indi-
viduals with ASC compared to controls (Shih et al. 2010).
Accordingly, atypical functional connectivity between
brain areas that underpin the modulation of imitation (e.g.
PFC) and those that underpin imitation itself (e.g. MNS)
may be responsible for the impaired social modulation of
imitation evidenced in the present study.
Conclusion
Thepresentstudyfoundthatcontrolparticipantsprimedwith
words promoting pro-social attitudes showed signiﬁcantly
higher levels of imitation than control participants primed
with words promoting non-social attitudes: this difference
between pro- and non-social groups was absent for individ-
uals with ASC. These results comprise the ﬁrst demonstra-
tion of atypical social modulation of imitation in individuals
with ASC. The ability to appropriately modulate levels of
imitation to suit the social situation is important in social
interactions hence this ﬁnding may help to explain some of
the social problems characteristic of ASC.
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